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ABSTRACT
By building a model of sharecropping in Less Developed Economies
which incorporates both monitoring costs and (dual) family labour
supply this paper builds a model whose predictions are consistent with
most of the stylised facts about developing agriculture.

SHARECROPPING IN DUAL AGRARIAN ECONOMIES: A SYNTHESIS
For almost two decades sharecropping has been an institution in
search of a generally agreed upon theoretical basis. Despite the con-
siderable theoretical and empirical work that has been done on this
2
issue there does not appear to be a consensus model of sharecropping.
In view of the fact that share leasing prevails in countries as dif-
ferent in their general economic structure as Bangladesh and the
United States it may perhaps be too much to expect that one model can
satisfactorily explain all known facts. In this paper, we therefore
limit ourselves to agrarian economies which display dual labour
markets (Bangladesh would be a good example). By incorporating two
important features of sharecropping that are observable in such econo-
mies our model succeeds in generating comparative static predictions
that are corroborated by most of the known evidence on this issue.
The two assumptions which have been frequently recognized in the
descriptive accounts of such economies, yet inadeauately explored in
the theoretical literature are, first, the existence of a dual labour
market, and secondly, the fact that sharecroppers are not always
3
landless peasants but rather are themselves small landowners. The
importance of imperfect labour markets has been stressed even by those
who are poles apart on the question of the efficiency of sharecropping,
while the propertied status of sharecropper should be evident from the
fact that, given the non-existence of markets for draught-animals, the
only way to do qualify for tenantship is to own bullocks; and also
—
possibly no less important— it is a means of establishing credibility
with landlords as regards their ability as cultivators. We have
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omitted Che complications of uncertainty from our model. This is done
with a view to focusing our attention to the ramifications of two
important elements that we have introduced in our model. Besides,
those who accept the recent results of Newbery and Stiglitz (1979), i.e.,
sharecropping offers no extra risk-spreading opportunities where there
is only output uncertainty, will consider this as a justified omission
in the context of our model.
By modelling a peasant economy in which the above empirical regu-
larities are emphasized we obtain implications that are consistent
with the following facts. First, labour intensity and output per acre
are higher on land owned by the sharecropper than on land sharecropped
for the landlord. This supports the Marshallian misallocation para-
digm and is reflected in the empirical work of Bell (1977), Hossain
(1978) and others for South Asia. Secondly, there appears to be a
positive correlation between the real agricultural wage and the inci-
dence of sharecropping, as noted by Bardhan and Srinivasan (1971).
Thirdly, the incidence of sharecropping is directly related to the
extent of labour-market distortion, a phenomenon pointed out by both
Hossain (1978) and Bardhan (1979). Fourthly, there is a negative
correlation between the elasticity of substitution in production and
the incidence of sharecropping (See, for example, Rao(1971)). Fifthly,
there appears to be a negative relationship between the incidence of
sharetenancy and the measure of labour-intensity in production. On a
cross-section basis, this would suggest that the more labour intensive
crops are likely to be grown under sharetenancy (Bardhan (1977)). And
on a time-series basis, this would imply that labour-saving technical
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progress will diminish the role of sharetenancy (Day (1967)). Sixthly,
as the cost of monitoring wage-labor increases, so does the incidence
of tenancy. This finding has been borne out by the empirical studies
of Lucas (1982) and Bogue (1959). Finally, there appears to be a
negative correlation between the supply of sharecropped land and the
amount of owned land by the tenant (Hossain (1978)).
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section I sets out
the basic model. Section II analyzes the static properties of the
solution. Section III turns to the comparative static results we have
obtained and points out their consistency with the known facts. The
Appendix contains proofs of various results that are only stated in the
text.
-L-
I. THE MODEL
A. The Assumptions and the Structure :
Consider a simple agrarian economy in which there are two classes
of agents, landlords (1) and sharetenants (s), and three factors of
production, land, labor and bullocks. The tenant has a small amount
of land owned by himself (k ) . In addition, he rents in some land
s s
(k ' ) on a fixed share-rental rate (r). The landlord is assumed to
have one unit of land at his disposal, of which he retains a given
amount (k ) and leases out the remainder for sharecropping. For
simplicity, we shall further assume that each agent has a given
endownment of draught animals (bullocks) whose services (b) have an
upper-bound of unity. Taking the lead of Bliss and Stern (1982), we
shall assume that the quantity of bullock services required for culti-
vation is an increasing function of the amount of land cultivated,
i.e., b = b(k), with 3b/3k > 0. Identical production functions are
assumed for all types of production—owner-cultivation by the landlord
on the retained land, tenant-cultivation of the owned-land and the
sharecropped land—and are of the following form:
(1) q = _f_(k, n,b(k)) 5 f(k, n)
where q, k and n are respectively the output, the land-input and the
labor-input. Assuming f is concave and linear homogeneous in all
inputs (i.e., we have assumed constant returns to scale), then f is
also concave and linear homogeneous in (k, n) as long as k < k, where
k is the upper limit of k defined by the farmer's bullock constraint.
(See Bliss and Stern (1982), chapter 6 for an empirical discussion of
this issue.)
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We shall, as noted earlier, assume that all tenants are identical
in managerial and entrepreneurial skills, possesion of bullocks, land,
etc. The landlord is assumed to divide his sharecropped land among m
such tenants:
(2) k
Z
°
= 1 - mk
SS
The implicit assumption embodied in equation (2) is that the share-
tenant rents land from one landlord. This is obviously a restric-
tive assumption; the analysis could be extended to contracting with a
limited number of landlords, thereby complicating the analysis without,
however, adding much by way of insight. If we had global constant
returns to scale, the actual value of m would have been indeterminate.
However, in our case, there is a lower bound for m in view of the
s sbullock constraint on the tenant. That is, if k " is very large, the
tenants' bullock-constraint may be violated. With this caveat, the
8
specific value of ra is irrelevant to our analytical results.
The tenant is assumed to divide his work-effort into three
so
activities: work on the owned land (n ), work on the sharecropped
ss sh
land (n ) and work for wages (n ). We assume (following Bardhan
and Srinivasan (1971), Lucas (1979) and others) that the sharetenant
(implying the family) can work outside the farm for wages. This
assumption is in accord with the South-Asian experience. On the other
hand, the landlord is assumed to work only on self-retained land.
(The same was assumed in Bardhan and Srinivasan (1971); for empirical
evidence, see Bardhan and Rudra (1980)). We assume that there is a
given agricultural wage rate (w) per unit of work-effort. Given the
-6-
5
above assumptions, we can express the income of the sharetenant (y )
I
and of the landlord (y ) as follows:
ti \ s c°n so so \ /i \ r s /i ss ss \ s h(3a) y = f (k , n ) + (1-r) f (k , n ) + wn
Production Income from share- Wage
from owned cropped land income
land
(3b) y =f(k ,n +n ) + mr f (k ,n )-wn
Production from
self-cultivation
Income from Wage
share rented bill
land
Finally, we shall assume that landlords and tenants have identical
tastes and can be represented by a twice-dif ferentiable, strictly
quasi-concave utility function:
(4) u=u(y,e) i=l, s
with u > 0, u < 0.
The above posits that utility is a function of income (y) and work-
effort (e). In the case of the landlord, we will assume that his work-
effort has two components. The first component comes from working on
self-cultivated land along with hired hands (n ) and the second com-
ponent consists of effort expended on monitoring of the work-effort of
the hired hands in the self-cultivated land (n ). For simplicity,
(like Lucas (1979)), we will assume that the monitoring effort of the
landlord (n ) is a monotonically increasing function of the amount of
hired wage labour (n ). More specifically, we will assume that the
total work-effort of the landlord can be written as:
-7-
/c \ 1 lo , lm lo , . t lh N , , _ ., ,_ Ih(5a) e = n +n = n + <j>(n ;y) with $ ' = 9<)>/9n >
The item u is a shift parameter which increases the monitoring cost and
we shall endow it with an economic interpretation in a later section.
On the other hand, in the case of the tenant, it consists of the work-
so
effort devoted to the owned land (n ), that to the sharecropped land
s s sh(n ) and finally that made available for hire (n ). However, we
assume that the tenant distinguishes between hired labour and family
labour, and charges a lower reservation price for family labour as com-
pared to the market wage rate. We embody this distortion of the
labour market by assuming that the tenants' "real cost" of one unit of
market labour is different from that of one unit of family labour, with
11
a given conversion rate (A > 1) betewen the two. Thus,
, K . s so ss , sh , .(5b) e = n + n + An A > 1.
Note that the distortions that we have introduced in (5a) and (5b)
give rise to a certain kind of duality in the labour market: whereas
the implicit wage level to the sharecropper is lower than the existing
market wage rate (because of the lower reservation-wage level for
family labour), the implicit wage level faced by the landlord is
higher than the market wage rate because of the presence of a positive
monitoring cost. This duality is crucial to the story of
sharecroppmg told here.
B . The Tenant Equilibrium
In this model, we shall assume the tenant maximizes his utility by
allocating his effort among alternative employment possibilities,
so ss sh
_, .... , , r-
n
,
n and n . The optimality problem of the tenant can be stated
as
. .
s , s so ss , sh.
maximize u (y , n + n + An )
r so ss sh
in , n , n
,. s _o ,, so so, >_ . _s ,, ss ss. sh
subject toy - f (k ,n ) + (1 - r) f (k ,n ) + wn
The first-order conditions for optimality are
(6a) u* f° + u* -
(6b) n* (1-r) f S
2
+ ujj =
s s(6c) u w + u ? A =
,
. ^ s ,„ s .o . - ro M so _, , _
.
where u. = ou fay
,
f = <3f /3n etc. The above first-order con-
X z
ditions carry the obvious marginal interpretations and hence will
not be elaborated here. Note that in the above the tenant takes the
s s
share-contract terms (k , r) and the wage rate (w) as the given para-
meters. Further, it should be noted that the above does not assume
s s
that the landlord has power over n , as is posited in much of the
existing literature in this area, e.g., Cheung (1969). It will be
noted that the disutility of effort is used essentially in the above
s
formulation, since a utility function involving only y would lead to
an unbounded solution because we have imposed no constraint explicitly
so s s s h
on n + n " + An , the total amount of labour that can be supplied
by a family.
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Given the concavity-convexity assumptions, the above equations can
13
be solved to derive the supply function of effort to various uses:
ti \ ss ss (y ss \ i so ^(7a; n = n. (k , r, w; A, k )
/-7t.\ SO SO /, SS , , SOv(7b) n = n. (k , r, w; A, k )
,-, >. sh sh /. ss
,
sOx(7c)n = n. (k , r, w; a, k )
The effects of change in various parameters on the equilibrium values
are summarized in Table I. In view of the indeterminacies that
afflict so many comparative statics results it is worth emphasizing
the determinate sign of every entry.
TABLE I
3k
SS
1
3w 3r 3k
S °
3X
ss
3n
so
3n
sh
For subsequent reference, also note that
(7d) 3n^ S /3kSS
- f2l /f22
= 4S/kSS > °
(7e) 3n^ S /3r = f^/Cl-r) t\
2
< 0.
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where the last equality in 7(d) is due to constant returns to scale.
C. The Landlord Equilibrium
The choices available to the landlord in this model are with
jj,
regard to the amount of labour he puts in (n ), the amount of labour
he wishes to hire in (n ) and also the share-contract terms (k * and
r). Unlike Cheung and many others, we will not require that the
landlord can enforce a minimum labour-intensity requirement. Rather,
we will assume that the landlord can influence the effort of the
tenant only indirectly by changing the share contract terms. Like
Lucas, we will assume that the landlord makes his optimality decisions
subject to the reaction function of the tenant—assuming that the
landlord can perceive the supply of effort embodied in equation (7a).
In this model, like that of Lucas (1979), the landlord incurs moni-
toring costs for hired labour if he opts for self-cultivation; on
the other hand, if he opts for share-tenancy, there is the disincen-
tive effect, part or all of which is swamped by the lower real costs
of family labour. The above noted distortions are crucial to the
existence of sharecropping in the present model.
Now the optimizing problem of the landlord can be stated as:
I I lo lh.
maximize u (y , n + <p(n ))
r lo ih . SS 1
In , n , k , rj
,
.
I ,.£ , , , ss Ih lo. , cs f . ss ss. lb.
subject to y = f ( 1-mk ,n +n ) + mr f ( k ,n J - wn
The first-order conditions for a maximum are
I 1 I
(3a) u* f* + U* -
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(8b) uj (fj - w) + u* y =
(8c) u* [-mfj + rar {f® + fj ( 3nSS /3kSS ) } ] =
(8d) u* [mf S + rm f* (3nSS /3r)] =
s s
The choices of k and r are made on the assumption that the landlord
s s 1
A
can correctly perceive the tenants' supply of effort (n^ ).
II. The General Equilibrium Solution
The present model has seven equilibrium conditions, equations (6)
, /ON . . . , , /So ss sh lo lh , ss v
and (8), in eight variables (n , n , n , n , n , k , r, w).
In keeping with the surplus-labor assumption, if the real wage level
is fixed, i.e., w - w, then the number of equations will equal the
number of variables. As our primary interest is not in the mathemati-
cal questions involved in the existence of a solution, but rather in
the qualitative implications of equilibrium, we proceed on the assump-
,,., . . 15tion that an equilibrium exists.
Given the above specification, by rearranging equations (6) and
(8), we can derive
(9) U = (1-r) Xf* = Xf° = f* + (uj/uj) '
s o
From the above, it is obvious that (1-r) f = f
,
which implies that
the tenant devotes more labour inputs to the owned land vis-a-vis the
rented land because of a share-tax on sharecropping. However, if one
compares labour allocation between the landlord cultivated land and
the tenant cultivated sharecropped land, the traditional Marshallian
-12-
inefficiency does not necessarily follow. Three sets of distortions
seem to be intermingled in the system: While the distortion intro-
duced by sharecropping is somewhat corrected by the lower "real" costs
of family labour, the advantages of self-cultivation by landlords is
also somewhat negated by the presence of monitoring costs in addition
to the market wage rate.
From the above equation, it is very difficult to infer whether the
labour-intensity on the sharecropped land will differ from that of the
landlord operated land.
The land allocation rule, as implied by (8c), is given by
(9b) f* « r Cf^ + f
S
2
(3n^ S /3kSS )}
s s s s
From Table I, we know ( 3nA /9k ) > 0. Thus, from the above one can-
not immediately infer whether the marginal productivity of land under
sharecropping is more than the land under cultivation by the landlord.
We shall show in a moment that the question of productive efficiency
(in the second-best sense) is crucially linked to the elasticity of
substitution in production.
Proposition I; With production functions obeying constant returns
to scale, the (sharecropping) general equilibrium solution would imply
r t— a as o — 1, where a is the share of land in the output under
general competitive conditions and o is the elasticity of substitution
in production.
s s s s
Proof : From equation (8d), we get f + f
?
r (3nA /3r) = 0. Now
s s
substituting from (7c) the value of (3nA /8r) into the above further
^ s s z. s
rearranging, we get f (1-r) f + r(f) = 0. Noting that f
-13-
s s s s s
= f
?
(k /n ) and also by further rearranging, one can reduce the
g c c o <_? o o t^ c; o
above equation to (l-r)/r = f_ f /f„ *f . (f
?
n /f
1
/k ). Remember-
SSS S SSSfSing that o = f f /f f , a s f V /f , one can reduce the above
equation to (l-r)/r = a(l-a)/a) which, on further manipulations, will
yield r = im where (it) = [a(l-a) + a]. Utilizing this, the proposi-
tion immediately follows.
The above proposition shows that if the production function is
Cobb-Douglas, a widely used production function for agriculture, then
the fraction of sharetenancy output going to the landlord for the use
of his land equals the share of output going to land under a standard,
purely competitive economy.
Proposition II : With production functions subject to constant
returns to scale, the sharecropping general equilibrium solution implies
that f. -r- f . as a — 1.
Proof: Equation (9b) implies f, = r {f, + f„ On. /3k )}. From
1 1 L *
ss ss ss ss
equation (7d), we know 3n. /3k = n., /k , which, on substitution,
X r ,s . ,s , ss,, ss N1 „. ,.s
1
. yield: f„ = r [f + f- (n
ft
/k )]. Since f is subject to
constant returns to scale, the above equation can be rewritten as
a s ss z
f = r (f /k ). Now utilizing proposition I, we can write f
s
- irf from which the above proposition immediately follows.
Note that if the production function is Cobb-Douglas, then land
allocation under sharetenancy would be efficient, i.e., the marginal
productivity of land under sharetenancy and under owner cultivation by
the landlord will be equal.
Proposition III : With constant returns to scale production func-
tions, under the snarecroppmg equilibrium, r^ — r„ as o — I.
-14-
a s %Proof : Since f and f are homogeneous of degree zero, then f and
s
f can be expressed as a function of land labor ratios. Further, it
% s
can be easily shown that f and f are decreasing (and identical) func-
i < s
tions of land-labor ratios and therefore, f.. ? f
1
would imply that
. i.,, ih , Aos > . ss, ss . . . . .. , c i . _sk /(n + n ) = k / n . Noting that since f
?
and f» are increasing
functions of land-labor ratios, (k /n + n ) = (k /n ) would imply
£>s A<s £>s
that f = f . Therefore, it follows f
1
= f implies that f„ y f .
But proposition II states that f = f if a = 1. Thus, f = f° if
a = 1. Q.E.D.
Some remarks are in order. First, the above propositions, taken
together, seem to resolve a paradox exposed by Reid and elaborated
upon by Lucas: the Marshallian tradition of sharecropping would
require that the marginal products of land and labour would both be
greater than those under competitive wage and rental markets. However,
like Lucas and others, we have shown that under constant returns to
scale both the above cannot be true and the paradox is thereby elimi-
nated.
Secondly, as noted by Bell (1977), who made the most thorough
empirical investigation in this area (followed by Hossain (1977) and
others who replicated the same test for other areas), there is a signi-
ficant difference in both input intensity and output per acre between
the sharecropped and owned land of the tenant, the latter being more
efficiently cultivated than the former, thus supporting the
Marshallian position. (However, a comparison of labour-intensity bet-
ween the landlord retained land and the sharecropper cultivated land may
not vield significant difference because of labour market distortions).
-15-
The prediction of our model seeras to be consistent with the findings of
Bell, Hossain and others in South Asia.
Thirdly, the above results also show that if the production func-
tion is Cobb-Douglas, irrespective of the precise functional form of
the utility function, the equilibrium share of land under sharecropping
is equal to the imputed share of land under a competitive structure .
This is also true with respect to labour and the economy would be
achieving second-best optimality (first-best optimality is not
achievable because of labour-market distortions). However, if the
elasticity of substitution is less than unity, then the equilibrium
share rental of land (the market rental rate) would be greater than the
imputed competitive output-share of land. Similar results were also
obtained by Newbery and Stiglitz (1979) who argued that the above
result "perhaps provides an explanation of the small share of labour in
most sharecropping arrangements. Traditional sharecropping arrange-
ments have involved shares of workers of between one half and two-
thirds, while the share of labour under more modern conditions of pro-
ductions appears to be considerably greater" (p. 321).
Fourthly, the above result can be further interpreted to imply way
that, as long as the elasticity of substitution in production, a, lies
In the interval [0,1), the return to the landlord from sharecropping is
likely to be greater than that from an alternative fixed rental system.
The reverse is, of course, true for a lying in the open interval (l, 00 ).
A curious vindication of the result has been provided by Rao (1979),
who noted that in India, crops for which there is very little scope for
-16-
decision making, for product as well as factor substitution, are share-
cropped; whereas those with greater possibilities of substitutability
are cultivated under the fixed-rental system. As an illustration,
he noted that crops like rice where there is 'limited scope for
allocative decision' is sharecropped; but crops like tobacco, chillies
and sugar cane, where there is greater 'scope' are cultivated under the
fixed-rental system.
Finally, the above analysis perhaps provides some clues why
sharecropping persists in the face of the incentives problem. Even
if sharecropping is inefficient (vis-a-vis owner-cultivation of the
tenant), the landlord cannot hope to organize the cultivation of land
any better because of pervasive labour-market distortions. This also
seems to explain why landlords engage in both self-cultivation and
sharecropping simultaneously.
-17-
III. COMPARATIVE STATICS
We now describe some comparative static results derivable from the
present exercise and check their consistency against the empirical
evidence accumulated in this area.
The equilibrium conditions of the landlord described by equations
ss s s
(8a) - (8d), on substituting of the values of (3nA /3k ) and
ss
( 3n^ /3r) and on further simplification, can be reduced to the
following:
(10a) f* " x* =
(10b) f
*
- (w + xV) =
(10c) f* - irf® -
1 11
where x = -u /u and it = l/[a(l-a) + a]. Totally differentiating the
s s
above equations, one can find that (3k /3w) is in general indeter-
minate, a result earlier noted by Newbery (1975). The reason is essen-
tially that an increase in the wage rate gives rise to two opposite
effects: on the one hand, it will increase the cost of self-cultivation
by the landlord; but on the other hand, it will decrease the labor-input
supplied by the tenant on the sharecropped land. While the former will
act as an inducement for sharecropping, the latter will act as a
repellent. However, our results shows that for a in the range (0,1),
i.e., the range in which sharecropping is practised at least in the
c , , , 16context or the present model,
(a) 3k
SS /3w > 0.
-18-
(See the Appendix for derivation.) This is consistent with the evi-
dence from India, where, on the basis of cross-section data, Bardhan
and Srinivasan (1971) found that a positive association exists between
the wage rate and the incidence of sharecropping.
(b) (3kSS /3X) > 0;
as the degree of distortion in the labour market increases, the inci-
dence of sharecropping increases. A possible measure of this distor-
tion in the labour market may be provided by the rate of unemployment
in the economy. The above result would imply that the larger the
extent of unemployment facing landless households, the larger the
extent of sharetenancy. This was verified for India with cross-
section (regional data) by Bardhan (1979). Furthermore, Hossain
(1978) found that for Bangladesh the supply of sharecropped land is
(ceteris paribus) positively related to the size of the farmer house-
hold. Besides, casual empiricism confirms that over-populated
countries do have a higher incidence of sharecropping.
ai ss
3k
S °
implying that the supply of sharecropped land is negatively related to
the amount of family-owned land. This result will follow—if not for
any other reason—because of the bullock constraint of the tenant
household. If families of different sizes do have differential trans-
actions costs for outside employment, this result will be further rein-
forced. This result was empirically verified for Bangladesh by Hossain
(1978).
-19-
(d) -%- < 0;da
i.e., as the elasticity of substitution in production increases, the
incidence of sharecropping decreases. Rao (1971) found that in India
crops with low elasticity of substitution in production seem to be
grown under sharecropping, which supports the above prediction.
ai ss
(.)..-V>°
The result implies that as the cost of monitoring the wage-labor
increases, so does the incidence of tenancy (see, Lucas (1979)).
Indirect evidence for this finding has been provided by empirical studies
of South Asia (and, curiously enough, also of the U.S.), where it has
been observed that absentee landlords—who presumably have to incur
higher monitoring costs to employ wage labor—usually prefer some form
of tenancy to wage cultivation (see, for example, Lucas (1982), and
Bogue (1959)).
(f)
-if— < oda
This implies that the higher the labour-intensity of crop production,
the higher the percentage of area under tenancy. Alternatively, on a
time series basis, this would suggest that if there is a labour-saving
technical progress, the incidence of sharecropping will diminish.
Evidence for the former is provided in Bardhan (1977) and Bardhan
(1979) while on the latter, the best source is Day (who records how
sharecropping had its demise in the U.S. with the introduction of
labour-saving techniques in agriculture).
-20-
CONCLUSION
One reason why sharecropping has appeared to provide such a
disparate series of results is the inherent complexity of the issues.
A typical peasant for example can, hypothetically , choose between wage
labour, sharecropping and farming (i.e., "renting" in the European
sense). The typical landlord has all these options, i.e., he treats
his labour supply like that of a peasant and, In addition, he has to
decide which system to adopt for the cultivation of his own land. A
general model encompassing all these choices becomes unwieldy and ana-
lytically intractable. How then should the model be simplified? In
this paper we have introduced various restrictions on peasant and land-
lord behaviour which, we believe, are well justified in the descriptive
accounts of sharecropping. The landlord, for example, was assumed not
to offer any wage labour, nor is the tenant assumed to be able to
obtain as much land as he wished to sharecrop. By incorporating such
assumptions we have built a model that is at once simple and yet provi-
des closer agreement with the known facts of sharecropping than any
other extant model.
-21-
Footnotes
1. A survey of this literature can be found in Quibria and Rashid,
(1984).
2. For an interesting and emphatic critique of the empirical assump-
tions made in many models, see Bell and Zusman, (1976).
3. One important precursor is Mazumdar (1975). However, his model
involves maximization by one party alone and does not address
itself to the wide set of questions we pose in the present exer-
cise.
4. This view has received a recent empirical support in the important
study of Bliss and Stern (1982). Based on an intensive study of
Palanpur, an Indian village, they argue that "a would-be tenant
had to be 'qualified' if his desire to lease-in land was to count
seriously. To be qualified, the tenant must have the means to
cultivate, notably he has to own bullocks... This is not
surprising in view of our observation. .. that it is nearly
impossible to obtain the use of bullock-services through the
market or even, with the exception of rather marginal cultivation,
through exchange arrangement." (pp. 128-29)
5. We must add that though our model has had considerable success in
explaining sharecropping in South Asia, there is much more varia-
tion in historical and geographical terms than is captured in the
present paper. For an interesting paper in this regard, see Pearce
(1983), as well as several other papers in the same issue of the
Journal of Peasant Studies .
6. Bell and Zusman have argued, quite emphatically, that any analysis
which seeks to explain the rental rate "must" take into account
the fact that the tenant possesses land of his own (p. 579). But
interestingly enough, later in the theoretical formulation, "to
make matters simple" they assume that tenants are landless.
7. This was assumed by many including Bardhan and Srinivasan, Lucas
and others. The Indian evidence, cited by Bell, indicates that
the overwhelming majority of the tenants lease land from one or
two landlords only.
8. This result contrasts with Braverraan and Srinivasan (1981) where m
is an important control variable for the landlord. The difference
arises from their somewhat peculiar assumption (which is neither
supported empirically nor by a priori tenant utility maximization)
that the tenant cannot take advantage of the labor market; and the
landlord by varying the land size (or the tenant number) can nail
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him down to the utility-equivalent level of the wage laborer.
Another important difference of the Braverman-Srinivasan model with
the present one is also worth noting: Whereas in the Braverman-
Srinivasan world, the tenants and wage laborers are drawn from the
same pool, in the present analysis they are assumed to have come
from two different pools. Furthermore, whereas in Braverman and
Srinivasan the tenant and the landless wage laborer enjoy the same
utility level in equilibrium, in the present case this is not true.
9. A special case of the present model is provided by the instance
where the landlord does not involve himself in any physical work;
his effort on the self-retained land—whatever he decides to make
—
is devoted exclusively to monitoring of hired hands. This special
case is applicable to a sizeable segment of the landlord class in
South Asia. However, this would not change any of the qualitative
results of the paper. We would have to simply replace equation (5a)
by the following modified form:
(5a') e
1
- <Kn
lh
;u) with <j>' > 0.
10. This is in the spirit of Sen, Bardhan (1973), Mazumder (1975) and
others. For an empirical study, see Hossain (1977). Hossain made
a comparative study of the market and (imputed) family wage rates
for Bangladesh and found that the former was much higher than the
latter. It may be noted that such an assumption of duality can
also help explain a much-noted "stylized fact" of the peasant
agriculture: the inverse relationship between the farm size and
the output per acre (traceable to higher labour-intensities of
smaller farmers vis-a-vis bigger farmers).
11. The economic basis of duality— though it has been the subject of
good deal of recent discussion—has been far from settled. While
some economists (notably A. K. Sen) would argue its justification
in terms of subjective costs like alienation of working as a wage
laborer, others would put it in terms of objective costs like
search costs (measured in time) associated with market employment.
In either case, however, the fact remains that X > 1. In the text,
we have— basically for reasons of simplicity—assumed that X is
fixed for cultivators of all sizes, i.e., the search and transac-
tions costs for outside employment are the same across the board.
A recent study by Huq (1984) in rural Bangladesh tends to cast
doubt on the presumption: he finds that the landed class has lower
transactions cost, and has a better chance of outside employment
for its surplus labor, than the landless. Besides, as landowner-
ship increases, the household can find employment for its excess
labor either because of better social connections or it can possibly
organize non-farm activities more easily. Given the above, we elected
to explore the implication of an alternative assumption that
(5b') X = X(kS °), with X > 1 and X'(k
S
°) < 0.
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The assumption has the interesting implication that, even within
the tenant class, the same sort of size-productivity inverse rela-
tionship will exist (because of differential transactions costs).
However, the direct empirical evidence in this regard is yet too
fragmentary to arrive at a firm conclusion.
12. In emphasizing the importance of these labour-market distortions
in the emergence and persistence of sharecropping, at least in
South Asia context Abhijit Sen (1981) went so far as to argue,
"Sharecropping could be seen as an institutional response whereby
rich owners could capture some of the 'cheapness' of 'poor
peasants' family labour and could save on supervision. Thus,
despite its disincentive effects, sharecropping was not
necessarily unattractive to large owners, given the factors
causing the inverse relationships between farm size and labour
use" (p. 327). However, though these aspects of labour distor-
tions have received adequate attention in the empirical litera-
ture, it has most surprisingly been ignored in the theoretical
literature.
13. The continuity of the labour supply functions defined by (7a)-(7c)
can be ensured if the maximum to the tenant optimizing problem is
a unique one. In the present case, this can be shown as follows.
For a given set of data {kss , ks0 , w} , the income function of the
tenant can be written as ys = <Knso , nss , nsn ) (see the equation
(3a) in the text). The income function is a concave function of
its arguments, given the concavity of the production function.
Now the set V = {(ys , nso , nss , nsh ) | ys <_ i|i (nss , nso , nSh)} i s a
convex set, which follows from the concavity of ^. Now the uti-
lity function us (ys , nso + nss + Xnsn ) is defined to be a strictly
quasi-concave function. Then it is relatively straight-forward to
prove that a quasi-concave function us defined over a convex set V
defines a unique maximum. Therefore, the tenant solution (ys ,
nso
,
nss
,
nsn ) represents a unique maximum. This in turn ensures
* * *
the continuity of the supply functions.
14. Carrying through the same line of argument as resorted in footnote
(13), one can show that, given our assumptions, the landlord
solution is a unique one.
15. Given our assumptions of a certain world and constant returns to
scale, the reader might wonder whether we also run into the
Bell-Braverman (1980) existence problem. The Bell-Braverman model
however does not include any of the "imperfections" included in
our mode; dual family labour for tenants and monitoring costs for
the landlord. Of course, if both these effects are very weak then
the Bell-Braverman results can be modified to apply; however,
this is not very interesting. We assume throughout that labour
market "imperfections" are sufficiently strong to make such models
worth separate analysis.
-24-
16. a has been parametrised by assuming a C.E.S. production function,
See the Appendix for details.
17. Although we have not concerned ourselves with land-reform issues
in this paper, it should be clear that because tenants are more
productive on their own land than on sharecropped land, any
measures that distribute land to the tiller will increase static
efficiency. If the social welfare function is egalitarian e.g.,
Benthamite, then this will be a further reason for land reform.
-25-
References
P. K. Barclhan, "Size, Productivity and Returns to Scale: An Analysis
of Farm Level Data in Indian Agriculture," J. Pol. Econ.
,
Nov. -Dec. 1973, 81, 1370-1386.
P. K. Bardhan, "Variations in Forms of Tenancy in a Peasant Economy,"
J. Development Econ. , June 1977, 4, 105-18.
P. K. Bardhan, "Agricultural Development and Land Tenancy in a Peasant
Economy: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis," Amer. J. Agri.
Econ. ," Feb. 1979, 61, 48-57.
,
and A. Rudra, "Terms and Conditions of Sharecropping
Contracts: An Analysis of Village Survey Data in India," J. Dev.
Stud.
,
April 1980, 16, 287-302.
,
and T. N. Srinivasan, "Cropsharing Tenancy in Agriculture:
A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis," Amer. Econ. Rev.
,
March
1971, 61, 48-64.
C. Bell, "Alternative Theories of Sharecropping: Some Tests and
Evidence from Northeast India," J. Dev. Stud.
,
July 1977, 13,
317-346.
C. Bell and A. Braverman, "On the Non-Existence of 'Marshallian'
Sharecropping Contracts," Indian Econ. Rev. , July 1980, 15,
201-203.
,
and P. Zusman, "A Bargaining Theoretic Approach to
Cropsharing Contracts," Amer. Econ. Rev.
,
Sept. 1976, 66, 578-588.
C. T. Bliss, and N. H. Stern, Palanpur - Studies in the Economy of
a North Indian Village
,
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1982.
M. B. Bogue, Patterns From the Sod
,
Arno Press, New York, 1959.
A. Braverman, and T. N. Srinivasan, "Credit and Sharecropping in
Agrarian Societies," J. Dev. Econ. , Dec. 1981, 289-312.
S. N. S. Cheung, The Theory of Sharetenantcy
,
Chicago, Chicago university
Press, 1969.
R. H. Day, "The Economics of Technological Change and the Demise
of the Sharecropper," Amer. Econ. Rev.
, June 1967, 57, 427-449.
M. Hossain, "Agrarian Structure and Land Productivity: An Analysis
of Farm Level Data in Bangladesh Agriculture," unpublished doc-
toral dissertation, University of Cambridge, 1977.
-26-
j "Factors Affecting Tenancy: The Case of Bangladesh
Agriculture," Bangladesh Dev. Stud. , Summer 1978, 2, 139-163.
S. Huq, "Patterns and Distribution of Rural Opportunities: A Compara-
tive Study of Two Bangladesh Villages," unpublished doctoral
dissertation, Boston University, 1984.
R. E. B. Lucas, "Sharing, Monitoring and Incentives: Marshallian
Misallocation Reassessed," J. Pol. Econ. , June 1979, 87, 501-521.
R. E. B. Lucas, "Labor in Four Districts of India," Boston University
mimeo, November 1982.
A. Marshall, Principles of Economics (8th ed.), London, MacMillan, 1956.
D. Mazumdar, "Size of Farm and Productivity: A Problem of Indian
Peasant Agriculture," Economica
,
May 1965, 32, 161-173.
,
"The Theory of Sharecropping and Labor Market Dualism,"
Economica
,
August 1975, 42, 261-71.
D. M. G. Newbery, "The Choice of Rental Contract in Peasant Agriculture,
in L. Reynolds (ed.), Agriculture in Development Theory
,
New Haven,
Yale University Press.
D. M. G. Newbery and J. E. Stiglitz, "Sharecropping, Risksharing and
the Importance of Imperfect Information," in J. A. Roumasset et.
al. eds., Risk, Uncertainty and Agricultural Development , New York,
Agriculture Development Council, 1979.
R. Pearce, "Sharecropping: Towards a Marxist View," Journal of
Peasant Studies
,
Vol. 10, Nos. 2 & 3 (Jan. /April 1983), edited by
T. J. Byres.
M. G. Quibria and S. Rashid, "The Puzzle of Sharecropping: A Survey
of Theories," World Development , February 1984, forthcoming.
C. H. H. Rao, "Uncertainty, Entrepreneurshi.p and Sharecropping in
India," J. Polit. Econ., May/June 1971, 79, 578-95.
Abhijit K. Sen, "Market Failure and Control of Labor Power: Towards an
Explanation of 'Structure' and Change in Indian Agriculture: Part
2," Cambridge J. of Econ. , 1981, 5, 327-350.
A. K. Sen, Employment, Technology and Development , Oxford, Oxford
University Press, 1975.
D/137
-27-
Appendix
The total differentials of equations (10a) - (10c) provide us
with;
3x
3n
lo
•21
-mf
b+(l-*'>^
3n
ih -mf
21
21
•21 -(mfJ 1+,f
S
u )
dn
io
dn
Ah
dk
ss
3w
dw
dw + $' (42L-)dw + x 4>'du3w M
..s 3ir
, c s 3n^
h-^' da + vfi2i\ dX + f? -^-
rS 3ir , _s Sn"
r— • da + irf -r—
1 3a 12 3w
1 I
where a = f„„ :— and b = r
"22
. Jto
3n
22
a
Jth*
3n
dw
Note that, in taking these differentials, we have assumed, for simpli-
city, that 4>" = 0. An alternative assumption would not add much
insight, but serve to clutter up the already messy algebra. Further
note that,
3x
I
-[(f* - w)p + <j>'q]
3x
*
-[f*P + q]
3n ( V
ox
3w I 2(up-
and
3k
SS
'
. £o
3n (u )
= o,
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where p = u u„ - u~ u and q = u. u„
2
- u„ u _.
Given Chat both income and leisure are normal goods, p < and q < 0.
This further implies that
> 0, ^V > and 4^- < 0.
.Ah * - Jto 3w
dn dn
a
*
a
I
- c . - dx oxDerine z =
, Zh - Zodn dn
Unpon substitution, we get,
z =
W? + (l-»')q
>
provided (1-r) > o.
(ujr
However, from (10a) and (10b), we find that (1-<K) =
—f hence, (l-<j>') > 0.
x
Let D denote the determinant of the matrix on the LHS and D.. the
r r . . . th , . th .,
cofactor of the element in the l— row and j—— column.
D
31
= f
i2
(1-<,,,)z; D
32
= " f
12
z;
°33
= (1_<l> ' )f22
z; D > °"
We now have:
„ss
, „ ssdk
ow
= D {-r
12
z + »f12 -S7-*(l-#
, )f
22 *J
ss -ir(l-a)f^ -(l-a)f*
Since irff. —§— - ±- = ±- from (10c) and, by CRS
,
LZ dw n
a -i ki_ ^
22 21 Zlv lo'
n +n
Upon substitution we get
ife!l. D-lj-f* z + 12=52** a(W) f i k< }
3w l 12 ^t 12 *T^ , Zh *o '(n +n )
From (10a) and (10b), ^ -~-. Whence,
w %
2
etc: f £
= D f .{-1+— }dw 12 L a _Z Ah_ Zo J
f
2
n +n
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Since — rr
5
is the relative factor share on the landlords
f
2
(n n }
a*
retained land, which we denote by , A , , we get:
9k
ss
-1.1 r . (1-a) a*
1
—
r
= D f.-wj-l + jz -r-r]
3w 12 c a (l-a*) J
We will need the following lemma:
(1-a*) a* > >
Lemma 1: For a CES Production Function, -r- — — 1 as 0" — 1.(l-a*)a < <
,
* **%*
D * a
*
**
-
k 1
Proof: 3- = f1-a* 1 .%. £h io. .I
,
I J.
f„(n +n ) f - k f
irf k
,
from (10c) and CRS.
f - irf k
TTfJk
S (kVkS )
Rearranging: r = —r-
1 a
f7 - irf^k
S (k it /kS )
1 1
(uf SkJ)/f
S
(f
;
7f S )/(k Z /k S ) - ir(f^k S /f S )
jra
(f*/f S )/(k*/k S ) - ira
z i /f*'\
a
By the CES property, / = j= it , from (10c).
a* ira a
Hence, 1-a* a a-1 - a
ir - ira it
(1-a) a* 1 - a > . .. ,
n ,
> a-1
Tnererore, -r~, 3-;— = ; -r 1 according as, (1-a) — it - a, or(1-a*) a a-1 < ^ ' < '
> . > * -
a
as, 1 — tt, i.e. , a — 1.
Q.E.D.
3k
SS
..
-12 r (l-a)a*
;
< >
—
r
= D fI2 z -1 + -rz tt— r t~ as a — 1.3w l (l-a*)a J > <
Since sharecropping is most likely to exist for a in (0,1), we finally
get,
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(a)
-T—> °-3w
From our system of total differentials,
/, \ 3k
""
-1 r .s 3n l(b)
-JT= D tD33 ,rf12 -3X-1
As
^ ss ., ss
— > 0, D > 0, we have *^ > 0.
3
ss
< c)
-3^ = D ^ fl^ D33^
3tt
-(l-o)
As ^ < for a in (0,1), the relevant range of share-
17
3k
SS
cropping, we have —r < 0.
(d)
~Jo~
= D
l
f l!7 D33^
3tt
-fl-a) . _. . .
_
, ,
3k , _
As -r— = > = < 0, it follows that —= < 0.dO I dO
ir
(e) i^=D- 1 {D
32
x%'
u
}
3U
Assuming that <j>' > 0, i.e., the shift parameter increases the (mar—
3k
SS
ginal) cost of monitoring, since V> > and D > 0, we get — > 0.
Finally, note that the optimising calculus of the landlord implies
3k
SS
that = 0. In other words, in the present formulation, the land-
3k
S °
s s so
lords optimising k v is independent of the tenants own holding, k
Now note that the bullock capacity of the tenant sets the constraint
oi ssso s s ~~~ o k.
k + k "" < k. This implies that < - 1 < 0. In other words, there
3k
S °
is likely to be an ex post negative relationship between tenant land-
holding and the availability of sharecropped land to him, even if the
landlord does not discriminate among tenants on the basis of land-
holdings. However, the landlord will discriminate when tenants have
31-
different labor transactions costs (as was noted in footnote 11) and
^ ss
on
tenant optimisation will imply that < 0. For example, suppose
3k - ss
X X(k ) with X' < and X > 1. In this context, < and
« I « ss - 3k
3x ,-S dn 1
= pf„ * r—— > 0, instead of being zero. The corresponding
3k
S
° " 3k^ (u~V
-i l 3kss rx~l/^ 9xA _. , , 3x£ icomparative static result now becomes, = D ID-, + D„_ <p f,
3k
S
°
31
3k
S
°
32
3k
S °
or (f) JQe!1. u-lj^f* !*!_} < o.
3k
S ° U
3k
S °
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